The guest list read like a who’s who in this administration. Definitely the A list. In his remarks, President Bush declared, “our nations are closer than ever before.” Earlier in the day, Bush and Singh met with business leaders from both countries. The next day Singh addressed a joint session of Congress.

Even more significant than this pomp and ceremony, Bush agreed to share nuclear technology with India, reversing the long time U.S. policy to discourage countries from developing nuclear weapons. The deal, which is subject to congressional approval, would give India access to U.S. nuclear technology and conventional weapons systems.

What was left unsaid is why this remarkable deal was formulated. But for those following closely Asian political and military developments, no explanation was needed. The Bush administration has embarked in recent months on a broad strategy to strengthen Japan and India militarily in the hope that they will be regional counterweights to China.

This is a new formulation of Europe’s balance of power in the nineteenth century. It may on balance be the right course of action for the United States, but we should recognize that President has taken a bold gamble fraught with three potential dangers.

The first is that the United States’ position discouraging nuclear proliferation has been weakened. The spread of these weapons may be inevitable, but we are hastening it. Other countries will no doubt expedite their own nuclear development.

Second, we may be creating anxieties in Beijing which will increase the risk of war with China—precisely the result we are hoping to avoid. It was no coincidence that only four days before the deal with India was announced a Chinese general threatened the use of nuclear weapons if the U.S. intervenes in any conflict over Taiwan. Major General Zhu Chenghu was speaking for the Chinese government when he raised the specter of a Chinese response with nuclear weapons against the United States.

It’s unlikely that the timing was coincidental. Washington leaks like a sieve. China no doubt had advance warning of the deal Bush was proposing to Singh. Zhu’s words were a clumsy but dangerous effort to make Bush consider the deal.

The Chinese were wasting their time. This is politics Texas style. We have a president in Washington who isn’t intimidated by threats. If they had any impact at all, Zhu’s words led to strengthening of the deal for India.

Third, the deal is causing widespread consternation in Pakistan, which happens to be our most important ally in the Islamic world in the war against terror. Pakistan also happens to be a bitter foe of India. We made a serious error in Iraq by not appreciating the danger of animosity between Sunnis and Shiites. Let’s not make a similar mistake by failing to recognize the deep seated hatred between India and Pakistan. Again, religious differences are at the core. Hindu India against Muslim Pakistan. There is no doubt that the Pakistanis will believe those Indian nuclear weapons will be used against them.

Likely fallout from the deal is to send Pakistan rushing off to China to develop a nuclear arsenal on parity with India’s. The possibility is real that there will one day be a nuclear collision between India and China with adverse affects throughout the world.

More immediately, the deal will increase the animosity toward the United States in the Islamic world. This comes at a time when we are trying, albeit unsuccessfully, to win over hearts and minds of the Muslim world. Perhaps the President and his advisers have concluded that this goal is impossible to achieve.

What all of this means is that as top officials in the Bush administration look at our country’s future, they see the real challenge coming from China. And they are right. That’s the economic and potential military conflict that matters. The Middle East is only a sideshow. The real action will be with China.