[Allan Topol / AllanTopol.Com]
Lightning paced thriller writer
of International Intrigue
National Bestselling Author
HOME NEWS CONTACT BOOKS ORDER SUBSCRIBE NEWSLETTER ARTICLES

Muslim Conflict
by Allan Topol, [IMAGE]2005

ARTICLE ORIGINALLY APPEARED AT MILITARY.COM, June 29, 2006

Photo Courtesy: Julie Zitin
[Allan Topol / AllanTopol.Com] One of the most far reaching consequences of the Iraqi war is the sharp division which has been exacerbated in the Muslim world. There is more than a conflict between Sunnis and Shiites. These two groups have enormous animosity toward each other, which is difficult for westerners to appreciate, except by referring back to religious wars in Europe hundreds of years ago.

The dispute began in the seventh century when Shiites split off from Sunnis over a disagreement about who the Prophet Muhammad’s legitimate successors were. The Sunnis developed their own view of Islamic laws and practices. They now make up more than fifty percent of the Muslim world in the Middle East, although their percentage varies from country to country.

When the United States launched the war to topple Saddam Hussein, our objective was to develop democracy in Iraq. We expected that to be a difficult road to hoe. It is fair to say that decision makers in Washington did not anticipate, and could not reasonably have anticipated, that we would be unleashing a broad based conflict between Sunnis and Shiites that would radically change the face of the Middle East for many years.

The genesis of the current Shiite reawakening resides in the fact that in most countries the Sunnis have wielded political power and possessed far and away the greatest amount of wealth. The Shiites have been totally excluded from power and relegated to the low end of the economic spectrum except in one country—Iran. Shiites compose approximately ninety percent of the Iranians and since the overthrow of the Shah, the Shiites have been in control of the government in Tehran.

With Iran as a base, the Shiite leaders in Tehran have reached out to Shiites in other countries in an effort to undermine Sunni power. This has been a difficult and complex effort by the Iranians. For openers, there is not a common leadership or unity among Shiites generally. Rulers tend to be local rather than cutting across national borders. Second, with the exception of Iran, Shiites in the Middle East are for the most part Arabs rather than Persians. This difference is critical, particularly because of the suffering inflicted on Arab Shiites in Iraq by the Persian/Iranians during the long and bloody war which Saddam had with Iran.

Toppling Saddam Hussein has facilitated interaction among Shiite communities in various Middle Eastern nations. Within Iraq are some of the most important Shiite shrines and holy cities including Najaf. While Saddam ruled, it would have been unthinkable for Shiites, constantly persecuted by the Iraqi leader, to have visited these sites if they lived outside of Iraq. That has all changed, and the Iranian leaders have used this interaction as the means of spreading their influence throughout the Muslim world.

With democracy as the ruling objective and elections based upon one man, one vote, the Shiites have taken control of the Iraqi government. This is not surprising because they comprise approximately sixty percent of the population. For the first time, Shiites in countries other than Iran can observe development in Iraq and conclude that they too may be able to throw off the yoke of subjugation by Sunni leaders in their own countries. Shiite rebellion in other Middle Eastern nations, including Saudi Arabia and Kuwait is possible.

Then there is the question of what Tehran’s role will be in the unfolding political development in Iraq. The Iranian leaders could be a force for stability, exerting influence over their religious compatriots for compromise. On the other hand, they could encourage unrest, seek to strike a blow against the United States and encourage further bloody Shiite attacks against the Sunni community.

There are some optimists in Washington who believe it may be possible to harness Iranian support for our Iraqi position if we begin a dialogue with Tehran. That was one factor leading to the United States’ willingness to commence a dialogue with Iran about nuclear weapons.

Personally, I believe these optimists will prove to be wrong. The leaders in Tehran have not provided any basis to believe that they are interested in dialogue or compromise. They have no intention of facilitating an orderly American exodus form Iraq. To be sure, they don’t like the United States having a presence so close to their border. However, they’re prepared to accept that if they believe the United States is suffering sufficient casualties and loss of prestige from being in Iraq. As matters now stand, the Iranians potentially have a great deal to gain from the rise of Shiite rule in Iraq.