That expression is particularly apt in this situation. When the bulk of American troops are gone, the three most likely political scenarios for Iraq are: (1) a secular, more or less democratic government, with the Shiites in control because they have sixty percent of the votes; (2) a Shiite controlled theocracy for the entire country similar to the situation in Iran; and (3) partition of the country into three autonomous regions—Shiite, Sunni and Kurds.

At this point, a battle is being waged among Iraqis as to which of these three governmental structures will emerge. There are sharp differences among Shiite leaders with some favoring each of the three possible outcomes. The Sunnis are united on the first alternative because they reside primarily in the western part of the country, which is lacking in oil. In partition the Shiites would have the bulk of the oil in the south and the Kurds would have control of significant oil resources n the north. As a result, the Sunnis are likely to continue to fight, even to the point of mounting a full scale civil war to avoid partition. The irony here, of course, is that it was the Sunnis with only twenty percent of the population and without the oil in their area who dominated and controlled the country for decades, including the regime of Saddam Hussein. However, all of that is in the past.

While the battle about autonomy is being waged by the Sunnis against Shiites, there are sharp divisions within the Shiite community. Not all of the Shiite leadership favors a theocracy. There are some who would prefer the first alternative. Among those Shiites who favor a theocracy, there is a sharp split between those who prefer the second alternative under which they would have control of the entire country, and those who are willing to accept the third alternative and settle for a more limited theocracy.

The wild card in this deck is the government of Iran and its bellicose President Ahmadinejad. A very troublesome Reuters photograph ran in many newspapers on September 13. it depicted the Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki walking in a tranquil garden in Tehran with the Iranian President. On this official visit, Mr. Maliki led a large delegation to Tehran. For Mr. Maliki, the visit was a kind of homecoming because he spent several years during Saddam Hussein’s rule living in Iran. This visit underscored the fears of Sunni Arab leaders, both inside and out of Iraq as well as officials in the American administration that increasingly Iran is exerting influence over events in Iraq. Ultimately, it may be the Iranians who will persuade Shiite leaders to choose between the second and third alternatives. It is likely that they will select the second—going for the whole loaf rather than only part.

What Mr. Maliki’s visit confirms is that Iran, though a Persian and not an Arab country, is using its common bond with Shiites to create a “Shiite crescent” stretching from Iran through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon. All of those countries have significant Shiite populations and the animosity between Shiites and Sunnis is long and bitter.

The difficult issue for officials in the Bush administration is how to avoid de facto turning Iraq over to Iran when American troops leave. We have paid and are continuing to pay a tremendous price in terms of American lives and money to rebuild Iraq as a democratic nation after our ouster of Saddam Hussein. An Iranian dominated theocracy in Iraq would be every bit as bad if not worse than the situation under Saddam Hussein. At least then we had a counter point to Iran’s regional political ambitions. The law of unintended consequences is at work, and no one in Washington is happy with the current state of developments.

Beyond question, the first alternative is the most desirable for the United States. However, that may not be attainable. As between the second and third, the third would be preferable. However, this assumes that we will have the ability to influence the course of developments. This is beginning to look increasingly unlikely.